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Abstract: Recognition of new Stets and governments is a political act with legal reverberations. 
Although the recognition of new States and governments is a traditional concept of international 
law but the challenging recognition of the transitional government of Libya proved that this 
traditional concept still can be highly exigent. Traditionally, the States in providing recognition 
to a new government follow their own benefits and privileges and rarely consider the structure, 
capacity and public support for the new government. If the rule of law and respecting 
democracy is going to be means of promoting peace and security is various areas of the world, 
is not it time to redefine the traditional concepts of international law (included of recognition of 
new States and government) from a new perspective? Considering the fact that, the existence of 
a legitimate authority in a group enhances the effective functioning of that group and reduces 
the internal conflicts, it seems that it is time to expand the political concept of legitimacy of the 
authorities into the international law. Is there any State practice to support the argument? In this 
article, the existence of norm creating forces and role of legitimacy in the recognition of the 
Libyan Transitional Government is going to be analysed. The After studying the role of 
legitimacy of the Libyan NTC in passing the sovereignty from the past regime to the new 
government by the international community, the effect of lack of legitimacy on the previous 
regime will be examined and the question of withdrawing of recognition of governments will be 
addressed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Shaw defined recognition as “a method of 
accepting factual situations and endowing 
them with legal significance, but this rela-
tionship is a complicated one.”1 Actually, 
recognition is the reflection of the present 
governments of the world to current 
changes in the international scene.
2
 Rec-
                                                          
1
 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p185. 
2
 Yamali, N. What is meant by State Recognition in 
International Law. Ministry of Justice Turkey. 
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ognition indicates fundamental correc-
tions in geopolitics or the political system 
of a State. According to Yamali, recogni-
tion is a political act because the recog-
nizing State, before giving recognition to 
the new entity, considers its own con-
cerns and benefits,
3
 and recognition 
comes about in a doubtful atmosphere.  
Through recognition, a government re-
veals its cognition and true will about the 
situation in a State in a different vocabu-
lary and according to its opinion. Glahn 
strongly believes that the process of rec-
ognition is not merely political but has 
legal consequences.
4
 
 
In the Case of 
Guaranty Trust Co. v. the United States, 
the Supreme Court brought up the ques-
tion of “which government should be rec-
ognized as the representative of the 
State?” and emphasised that this question 
should be answered by the political de-
partment of the government as it is not a 
judicial question. Sloane says that, al-
though recognition is a political act of 
government, but in the recognition of new 
governments, legal norms and ethnic 
norms are considered.
5
 Van Essen ac-
knowledged the duality of recognition of 
new governments, and separated the ca-
pacities of recognition into political and 
legal capacities.
6
 Through recognition, an 
                                                                                  
Http://www.justice.gov.tr/e-
journal/pdf/LW7081.pdf/  (retrieved: November 
18, 2014). 
3
 Yamali, N., Note 2. 
4
 Gerhard Von Glahn et al. Law Among Nations, 
New York:  Taylor and Francis, 2017, p147. 
5
 Sloane, R. D, 2006, “The Changing Face of Rec-
ognition in International Law: A Case Study of 
Tibet,” Emory International Law Review, 16, 
p11 . 
6
 van Essen, J., 2012, “De Facto Regimes in 
International Law,‟ Utrecht Journal of 
International and European law, 28, p40. 
entity gets full state stature in interna-
tional relations. 
There are two main theories on the 
recognition of governments in interna-
tional law, namely declaratory theory and 
constitutive theory.
7
 According to the 
constitutive theory, no entity is entitled to 
an international personality without rec-
ognition.
8
 Grant says that, the emergence 
of “a State depends on the actions [i.e. 
recognition] of existing states.”9 From 
this perspective, recognition is the archi-
tect of the new government or State. Ac-
cording to Talmon, recognition of a new 
State has an absolutely constitutive effect 
on the recognition of its government be-
cause it is impossible to recognize a gov-
ernment without recognition of the 
State.
10
  
The problem with the constitutive 
theory is that firstly, a State or govern-
ment “exists” whether it is recognized by 
other States or not. The purpose of the 
existence of governments is not to be rec-
ognized but to rule the country. Accept-
ing the constitutive theory leads to the 
conclusion that other States and the inter-
national community are creating a new 
entity in a politically hazy atmosphere 
without any rationale behind the creation. 
                                                          
7
 Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International 
Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p92. 
8
  Martin Dixon, et al., Cases and Materials in 
International Law, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003, p154. 
9
 Thomas D. Grant, The Recognition of States: 
Law and Practice in Debate and Evolution, 
California: Praeger Publishers, 1999, p2. 
10
 Stephan Talmon, Who is a Legitimate Govern-
ment in Exile? Towards Normative Criteria for 
Governmental Legitimacy in International Law, 
the Reality of International Law, Essays in Honour 
of Ian Brownlie. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999, 
p502. 
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Secondly, according to Brierly, the legal 
status of a new State or government that 
has the recognition of some countries and 
not of others remains obscure.
11
 One may 
not conclude that an entity in such a situa-
tion, like Israel that is recognized by the 
UN and the majority of States but not by 
a handful of Arab and Islamic States, is 
entitled to an international personality in 
its relations with those States that recog-
nize it but not with those States that re-
fuse to recognize it.  
According to the declaratory theory, 
when an entity gains the essential ele-
ments
12
 of statehood, it comes into exis-
tence even if the existing States avoid 
recognizing it. In other words, the exis-
tence of a State or government is uncon-
nected to its recognition, and recognition 
just reveals hidden truth and helps to 
unleash a new reality. This theory ensues 
from natural persons; just as individuals 
are born and come into this world free 
from recognition by law, the States and 
governments also emerge and their exis-
tence is free from recognition but their 
entitlement to rights is a prerequisite for 
recognition by the society and the legal 
system. Dixon defined the declaratory 
theory as “merely a political act recogniz-
ing a pre-existing state of affairs.”13 The 
Brussels Resolution of 1936 by the Insti-
tute de Droit International on the recogni-
tion of new States and governments states 
that the existence of a new State or gov-
                                                          
11
  James leslie Brierly, The Law of Nations, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963, p138. 
12
 According to Montevideo Convention, the 
essential elements of States are included as: “a 
defined territory, permanent population and an 
effective government capable of entering into 
foreign relations”, Charter of the Organization of 
American States. 1948.  Art. 9. 
13
 Martin Dixon, et al., Note 8, p154. 
ernment does not depend on the recogni-
tion or non-recognition of other States. 
The Montevideo Convention of 1933, the 
Charter of the Organisation of American 
States of 1948, and the ICJ in its advisory 
opinion on the application of the Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide,
14
 also support this 
theory. The Arbitration Commission of 
the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia ex-
pressly announced that recognition is de-
claratory.
15
 Brierly said it is possible for a 
State to come into existence without be-
ing recognized by other States “and it has 
a right to be treated by them as a State.”16 
The problem with the declaratory theory 
is that when a State or government can 
come into existence without being for-
mally recognized by the existing States, 
what is the effect of the recognition?
17
 
Talmon answered that the effect of the 
recognition from this perspective is a 
“confirming effect.”18 This theory does 
not explain why non-recognition of a 
State or government is effective when the 
existence of the State or government is 
independent of its recognition by other 
States. Put in another way, the theory is 
suitable for recognition but has funda-
mental delicacies on the non-recognition 
                                                          
14
 Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Preliminary Objections, 1996, pp 661 and 686. 
15
 Bertrand G. Ramcharan, The International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: Official 
Papers, Volume 2, Leiden: BRILL, 1997, Opinion 
No. 1, P 1259 and Opinion No. 8, p1284. 
16
 James leslie Brierly, Note 11, p138. 
17
 Jure Vidmar, 2009, Democracy and State 
Creation in International Law, Nottingham: 
University of Nottingham, p61.  
18
 Stefan Talmon, 2004, “Constitutive Versus The 
Declaratory Theory of Recognition: Tertium Non 
Datur?,” The British Yearbook of International 
Law, 75, p107.  
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of States or governments. Moreover, the 
practices of the State do not support the 
theory, and under international law, new 
States or governments are not entitled to 
any rights before recognition.
19
  
As mentioned above, both theories of 
recognition have some deficiencies. Lau-
terpacht tried to solve the problem by 
presenting a new definition for recogni-
tion. In his view, when “the conditions of 
statehood are met, the States are under a 
duty to recognize the new State.”20 This 
definition of recognition interferes with 
the political nature of recognition but the 
common trend of the international com-
munity is to endow recognition to the 
new State or governments through inter-
national conferences and/or organisations 
collectively.  
In international law, States also rec-
ognize new governments. The difference 
between the recognition of a new State 
and a new government is that the latter is 
a duplication. On recognition of new enti-
ties in international law there are three 
categories: recognition of States, recogni-
tion of governments and recognition of 
belligerents. In recognition of States, 
other States and the international com-
munity examine if the new entity has the 
criteria for Statehood and what are the 
legal consequences of Statehood. In rec-
ognition of governments the question is 
that which group is able and may repre-
sent the country before the international 
community. In recognition of belligerents 
                                                          
19
  William Thomas Worster, 2009, “Law, Politics 
and the Conception of the State in State 
Recognition Theory,” Boston University 
International Law Journal, 75, p119.  
20
  Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts KCMG, 
Oppenheim’s International Law, UK: Longman, 
1955, Sec. 71. 
other States and international community 
will consider if the dissident armed group 
has met the criteria of belligerency and 
will try to put obligations under IHL on 
them.
21
  
The difference between the recogni-
tion of States and governments is that it is 
enough that the present countries recog-
nize the new State only once, but recogni-
tion of governments is (expressly or tac-
itly) repeated especially in cases of un-
constitutional changes.
22
 If the authorities 
of a State fail to gain the recognition of 
other States and the international com-
munity, this non-recognition never un-
dermines the international personality of 
the State. After recognition, new States 
enjoy a kind of permanence in view of the 
principles of non-intervention, self-
determination and inviolability of borders 
in international law. Wolfrum says that 
when other governments recognise a new 
government, actually they are revealing 
their will in maintaining relationships 
with it. According to him the effect of 
recognition of new governments is that 
they will be accepted by the international 
community, their laws and regulations are 
recognised before the courts of the recog-
nising States and the new governments 
will enjoy diplomatic immunities and 
privileges.
23
 
                                                          
21
. Louise Arimatsu & Mohbouda Choudhury, 
2014, “The Legal Classification of the Armed 
Conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Libya,” Chatham 
House, p19.  
22
 In other words, Brownlie said recognition of a 
new State may take the form of the recognition of 
a new government. 
23
 Rudiger Wolfrum & Christiane E. Philip, 2002, 
“The Status of the Taliban: Their Obligations and 
Rights under International Law,” Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law, 6, pp569-71. 
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According to traditional legal theory, 
the establishment of a new government 
through the constitutional process raises 
no questions concerning legitimacy and 
therefore, the recognition of that govern-
ment.
24
 Harris says, there is no need for 
recognition in cases where changes have 
taken place in accordance with the Con-
stitution of the State.
25
 Nevertheless, if a 
government gains power through non-
constitutional means, its recognition by 
other governments is doubtful until it is 
recognized by many States.
26
 Sloane says 
that, recognition of governments is a mat-
ter of legitimacy.
27
 According to d` 
Aspremnot an illegitimate government is 
never recognized as the representative of 
“the State of which it claims to be at the 
helm.”28 Sometimes it is not easy to dis-
cern which group is the government of 
the new State. For example, the African 
Union faced a lot of challenges concern-
ing the accreditation of delegates of 
newly-formed governments that came to 
power unconstitutionally.
29
 OAU tried to 
solve the challenge by creating a link be-
                                                          
24
 It has to be borne in mind that recognition of 
new states and governments is a political act and 
sometimes recognition is conferred to new entities 
where their legitimacy is under doubt because of 
political concerns.  
25
 D. J. Harris, 2004, Cases and Materials in 
International Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
p159. 
26
 M. J. Peterson, Recognition of Governments: 
Legal Doctrine and State Practice, London: 
Palgrave Macmillian. 1997, p3. 
27
 Sloane, R. D, Note 5, p110. 
28
 J. d`Aspremont, 2006, “Legitimacy of Govern-
ments in the Age of Democracy.” Journal of Inter-
national Law and Politics, 38, P 902.  
29
 Kofi  Oteng Kufuor, 2002, “The OAU and the 
Recognition of Governments in Africa: Analysing 
its Practice and Proposals for the Future,” 
American International law review, 17, p3 . 
tween democracy and recognition of new 
governments.
30
  
In 1997, the OAU refrained from 
recognizing the military coup in Sierra 
Leone because army officers overthrew 
“the democratically elected civilian gov-
ernment.”31 Moreover, the OAU, in a 
declaration known as the “African Union 
Declaration on the Principles Governing 
Democratic Elections in Africa”, high-
lighted the fundamentals of a democratic 
government and the legality of democ-
ratic changes, and provided principles on 
the methods for organizing free and peri-
odic elections.
32
  
According to Wolfrum, recognition 
of belligerents is also categorised as im-
plicit and explicit and their recognition is 
limited to armed conflict period. More-
over, it is possible that other governments 
or the government that the belligerents 
are fighting against recognised the bellig-
erents.
33
  
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
According to international law, the exist-
ing States in a particular situation are un-
der an obligation to refrain from recog-
nizing the political entity as a new State 
or government. There are two theories on 
the non-recognition of States and gov-
ernments, namely prohibition of prema-
ture recognition and the doctrine of 
obligatory non-recognition.
34
 
                                                          
30
 The 1998 text presented to the Security Council 
by Secretary-General titled, “The Promotion of 
Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in 
Africa”, UN Doc. A/52/871-S/1998/318. 
31
 Kofi  Oteng Kufuor. Note 29.  p388. 
32
 The 2013 African Union Declaration on Princi-
ples Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, 
Art(s) 2, 3 & 4 AHG/Dec1.1. 
33
 Wolfrum and Philip, Note 23, p580. 
34
  Jure Vidmar, Note 17, p61.  
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In international law, there is no obli-
gation to recognize new States and gov-
ernments, but in some cases, there is an 
obligation to abandon recognition.
35
 Rec-
ognition of an entity that lacks the tradi-
tional conditions of statehood or govern-
mental elements by the existing States is 
called “premature recognition.”36 The 
recognition of Bangladesh by India in 
1971 are examples of new States that 
were positioned by premature recogni-
tion. 
Non-recognition of new governments 
means refusal to acknowledge their exis-
tence, legality or validity. Vidmar says 
that, the doctrine of obligatory non-
recognition is about non-recognition of 
entities that have satisfied the traditional 
conditions of statehood or governance but 
their establishment is illegal.
37
 According 
to Lauterpacht, the fabrication of the non-
recognition of illegal situations is because 
the illegal situations cannot become a ref-
erence of legal rights for the law-
breaker.
38
 Put differently, if international 
law is considered as the language of the 
international community, then these ille-
gal entities are acting out of norm and are 
trying to speak a new language. The rec-
ognition of illegal entities as new States 
or governments is a violation of the right 
to self-determination of nations, and may 
trigger regional violence. It may endanger 
international peace and security because 
there are many territorial pleas and mi-
                                                          
35
 Jure Vidmar, 2012, “Explaining the Legal 
Effects of Recognition,” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 62 (2), P380. 
36
  Jure Vidmar, Note 17, p65.   
37
  Jure Vidmar, Note 17, p66.   
38
  Hersch Lauterpacht, 1947, Recognition in 
International Law, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, p420. 
norities seeking independence, and this 
endangers them by subjecting them to 
exploitation by the mega powers.   
The first precise case of non-
recognition was the state of Manchukuo 
in China, which was seized by Japan in 
1931. Although a handful of States, such 
as Poland and Spain, recognized it, the 
League of Nations abstained from giving 
recognition. The measures taken by the 
United Nations against the ruling military 
governments in Haiti and Sierra Leone 
and the non-recognition of Southern 
Rhodesia in 1965 were cases in which the 
doctrine of obligatory non-recognition 
was applied.
39
 In 1975, the UN refrained 
from granting recognition to the merger 
of East Timor with Indonesia.
40
 In the 
2000s, many international organisations, 
such as NATO and the Council of 
Europe, abstained from recognizing 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia to affirm the 
territorial integrity of Georgia. The latest 
case of non-recognition of a new State 
and government might be the case of 
Crimea. It is evident that in cases of ille-
gally-created entities and situations, the 
doctrine of obligatory non-recognition is 
applicable, and other States should refuse 
to recognize the illegal entity collec-
tively.
41
 The principle of collective non-
recognition is spelled out in Article 41 of 
the International Law Commission Arti-
cles on State Responsibility. 
Due to the increasing number of de-
mocratic States after the Cold War, there 
                                                          
39
 Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth, 2000, 
Democratic governance and International Law, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, p343. 
40
 K ennith Christie and Denny Roy, 2001, The 
Politics of Human Rights in East Asia, London: 
Pluto Press, p188.  
41
  Jure Vidmar, Note 17, p66.  
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seems to be a common trend in interna-
tional society to use democracy as an es-
sential element for recognizing new states 
and governments. Some authors claim 
that “the obligation of a non-illegal entity 
is an obligation owed erga omnes.”42 The 
holding of a democratic referendum by an 
entity is an important step in the recogni-
tion policy of the international commu-
nity but it is not conclusive. For the inter-
national community, besides the legiti-
macy of the government, stability and 
development are also important factors to 
consider in the recognition of new States 
and governments. 
 
Succession of the Gadhafi Regime by 
the Libyan NTC in the General As-
sembly of the United Nations  
At the 66
th
 session of the UN General As-
sembly (GA), the Committee of Creden-
tials recommended that the members 
grant the seat of Libya to the National 
Transitional Council of Libya (NTC).
43
 
At that session, interesting questions were 
discussed.  
The opponents rendered the seat of 
Libya to the NTC based on the rules of 
the GA about the Credentials Committee 
and political concerns. In the opinion of 
the representative of Angola, representing 
the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), according to Rule 
No. 27 of the UNGA, the head of State or 
government or the foreign minister of the 
State should sign the credentials. Then he 
asked the question: “Who signed the NTC 
                                                          
42
. J. Vidmar, Note 17, p66.  
43
 General Assembly of United Nations. 2013. Ses-
sion Archives. Available from:  
http://gadebate.un.org/sessions-archive/66. date of 
access [Retrived: June 5,2013].  
credentials that were accepted by the 
Credentials Committee?”44  
The representative of Venezuela, 
Ambassador Valero, based his reason on 
political concerns. He said, he believed 
that the Libyan NTC was a puppet group 
led by NATO forces and some western 
powers, and was not genuinely represent-
ing the people of Libya.
45
 He and some 
media said that the NTC was a designated 
government, and the fact that its capacity 
and competence were always under ques-
tion backed this view.
46
 
The representative of Bolivia cited 
that his government was unsure if the 
Libyan NTC was the legitimate represen-
tative of the Libyan people because the 
people of Libya had not yet had the op-
portunity to express their will.  He added 
that the United Nations was being ma-
nipulated into a foreign, armed interven-
tion in Libya but the Libyan people who 
continued to suffer, had not yet had the 
chance to express their opinions and to 
set up their own legitimate Government 
                                                          
44
 GA. Note 43.  
45
 GA. Note 43. 
46
 Huffington Post. 2013. E. M. Lederer.  Libya 
National Transitional Council: UN Approves Seat 
for former Rebels. Available from: 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/16/libya-
national-transitiona-council-un-n-966339.html. 
[Retrieved: June 20, 2013].   Chathamhouse. 2013. 
Libya Working Group Report. Libya: Challenges 
after Liberation. Available from:  
www.chathamhouse.org [Retrieved: July 6, 2013].  
Pan African News Wire. 2011. A. Aziki. 2.11. 
Libyan Forces Regroup to resist Puppet Regime.  
Available from: 
www.workers.org/2011/world/libya-1117  
Available from:  [July 6, 2013]. Information 
Clearing House. 2013. A. E. Torbat, The Neo-
colonial Order is to Stay: A Puppet Government in 
Libya. Available from: www.informationclearing 
house.info/article29201.htm.  
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to represent their interests.
47
 The repre-
sentative of Granada said the necessary 
conditions for recognizing the NTC had 
not been aggregated yet, and this recogni-
tion would be premature
48
 
At the 66
th
 session of the UN General 
Assembly, the opponents to the recogni-
tion of the Libyan NTC, such as Egypt, 
voiced their political concerns. The repre-
sentative of Egypt asked the member 
States to recognize the NTC in order to 
support the ideals of the Libyan people.
49
 
The representative of Gabon an-
swered the question of the legitimacy of 
the NTC. In his opinion, the Libyan NTC 
supported the people of Libya since the 
beginning of the upheaval, and the other 
States individually recognized it as the 
legitimate representative of the Libyan 
people.
50
 The representatives of Senegal 
and Chad said that the Libyan NTC made 
great efforts to improve the humanitarian 
situation and supported the movement of 
the Libyan people towards freedom. In 
their opinion, these efforts should be rec-
                                                          
47
United Nations. 2015. Available from: 
www.un.org/press/en/2011/ga11137.doc.htm  and 
edition.cnn.com/2011/world/Africa/09/16/un.libya. 
[Retrieved:  February 18, 2015]. 
48
Reuters. 2015. Available from: 
www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/16/us-libya-un-
assembly-idustre78f4qa20110916  [Retrieved: 
February 18, 2015]. 
49
Reuters. 2015. Available from: 
www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/16/us-libya-un-
assembly-idustre78f4qa20110916  [Retrieved: 18 
February 2015]. 
50
 www.un.org/press/en/2011/ga11137.doc.htm 
accessed [18 February 2015] and General 
Assembly of United Nations, „General Assembly 
Seats National Transitional Council of Libya as 
Countries Representative for Sixty-Sixth Session‟, 
GA/11137.  
ognized.
51
 Arguably, the representative of 
Senegal provided a moral reason for in-
sisting on the cogency of the recognition 
of Libya.  
On 16 September, the Libyan NTC 
was recognized by the UN General As-
sembly
52
 as the legitimate representative 
of the Libyan people, and took the seat of 
Libya in the General Assembly. This rec-
ognition invalidated the diplomatic posi-
tion of the Gaddafi delegates in favour of 
those who represented the NTC. After the 
recognition of the Libyan NTC by the 
General Assembly, the African Union in 
late September recognized the Libyan 
NTC as the “sole representative of the 
Libyan people” if they formed an inclu-
sive transitional government.
53
The rec-
ognition of the NTC by the UN and the 
AU were wise decisions because accord-
ing to Bangerter, abstention from the rec-
ognition of such an impressive group that 
was not an extremist group posed the 
danger of the nature of the council being 
changed into that of a terrorist group.
54
 
Thus, recognition played a key role in the 
future of the NTC and the destiny of 
Libya. 
Recognition is a unilateral act and 
States cannot recognize the new entity on 
behalf of each other. In other words, the 
                                                          
51
United Nations. 2015. Available from: 
www.un.org/press/en/2011/ga11137.doc.htm 
[Retrieved: February 18, 2015].  
52
 With 17 against, 114 voting in favour, 47 absent 
and 15 abstentions. United Nations. Note 52.  
53
 Sithole, 2013, “The African Union Peace and 
Security mechanism‟s crawl from design to reality: 
Was the Libyan crisis a depiction of severe 
limitations?” African Journal on Conflict 
Resolution, 12, p158. 
54
 Bangerter, 2011, “Reasons why Armed Groups 
Choose to Respect International Humanitarian 
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right to recognition of new States/govern-
ments is not transferable.
55
 Thus, in col-
lective recognition, the individuality of 
recognition is respected and States which 
abstained from recognizing the new entity 
are not committed to establish diplomatic 
relations and do not consider sovereign 
rights and immunities for the new entity. 
Collective recognition provides the op-
portunity for the international community 
to apply new standards, such as a democ-
ratic mandate and respect for human 
rights, for the recognition of new gov-
ernments.
56
 This recognition may be 
purely a legal recognition and on apply-
ing it, just legal factors should be taken 
into consideration, although in the case of 
the recognition of the Libyan NTC, po-
litical and moral concerns played a fun-
damental role.   
If the goal of recognising the new 
States and governments is the establish-
ment of diplomatic and economic rela-
tions
57
 with the new entity or stabilizing 
the new situation, this goal can be met by 
individual recognitions provided by the 
States (act of recognition). The collective 
recognition of the new government by an 
international governmental institution, 
such as the UN General Assembly, up-
grades the new regime to a higher level.
58
 
                                                          
55
 Johnson & W. Lin, Taiwan and Recognition 
under US and International Law: A Legal 
Perspective, PhD Thesis: National San Yat-sen 
University, 2012, p125. 
56
 G. Pope Atkins, Encyclopaedia of the Inter-
American System, Westport: Greenwood 
Publishing Group, Westport, 1997, P128 and Percy 
E. Corbett, The Growth of World Law, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2015, p129. 
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The individual policies and privileges of 
States may be achieved through individ-
ual recognition, while the recognition by 
the international governmental institution 
indicates the legal and correct attitude of 
the new government.
59
  
If collective recognition has the same 
political motivations as individual recog-
nition, then why should a State recognize 
a new government individually and then 
vote for it in a collective recognition? 
Collective recognition is not simply ren-
dering the seat of the State to the new 
government; it reflects the greater reality 
that the international community is confi-
dent that the new government is able to 
shoulder its international responsibili-
ties.
60
 Moreover, collective recognition 
puts an end to doubts concerning the con-
tinuity of the political and legal status of 
the former regime; it is like burning a 
candle at both ends, i.e. the former regime 
loses its status both internally and exter-
nally. 
Through the collective recognition of 
the new government, the international 
community comes to the judgment that 
the new regime deserves to actively play 
an effective role on the international 
                                                          
59
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“collective recognition”, for example, in 1950; the 
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scene, whether it is supported by the in-
ternational community or not. Individual 
recognition of the new government is po-
litical recognition; collective recognition 
is recognition by international law. A 
study of the process of recognition of the 
Libyan NTC provides a good example of 
the collective recognition of a new gov-
ernment.  
Recently, “Universal Recognition” 
was debated within the context of the 
UN.
61
 Universal recognition still needs 
transparency. The difference between 
“universal recognition” and “collective 
recognition” should be considered. For 
universal recognition, it should be noted 
that in the international community there 
is always friction among the sovereign-
ties. Universal recognition leads to the 
recognition of the new government on 
behalf of other States. It is inconsistent 
with the principle of non-intervention in 
the domestic affairs of other States as 
provided for in the UN Charter and the 
Declaration of the Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
between States.  
It is suggested that instead of using 
the expression “universal recognition”, 
the expression “collective recognition” 
should be used because it matches the 
current realities of the international com-
munity. In 1971, the ILC defined collec-
tive recognition as occurring when States 
act collectively on a specific situation, 
evaluate the related information and come 
to a decision.
62
 Usually, the groups of 
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62
 The 1971 International Law Commission, 
„Document - A/CN. 4/245, Survey of International 
Law - Working Paper prepared by the Secretary-
General in the light of the decision of the 
States, via an official conference or meet-
ing, announce their recognition of the 
new situation or entity. Collective recog-
nition simplifies and catalyses the transi-
tion of the society
63
 to democracy and 
respect for human rights.  
The process of the recognition of the 
Libyan NTC also proves that recognition 
still is a vibrant notion of international 
law and it is becoming more and more 
complex each day because of the addition 
of new layers of human rights to interna-
tional law. International law is a law of 
recognition; every situation, rule, agree-
ment and government should be recog-
nized under this law. The case of the rec-
ognition of the Libyan NTC also proves 
that recognition is an intentional, optional 
and political act that no group can force 
onto other States and the international 
community.  
 
Recognition of the Libyan NTC; With-
drawal of Recognition of the Gadhafi 
Regime 
Concerning the recognition of the Libyan 
NTC as the legitimate representative of 
the Libyan people, was the act of the 
Libya Contact Group in asking the par-
ticipating States to revoke the political 
position of the Gaddafi delegates
64
 
equivalent to the withdrawal of recogni-
tion of the de jure government of Libya? 
If the answer is yes, then it is inconsistent 
with the current rules of international law 
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on the recognition of States as it is not 
possible to withdraw the de jure recogni-
tion of already recognized governments. 
De jure recognition cannot be with-
drawn because the ruling government is 
the legitimate representative of the people 
and a symbol of the incarnation of their 
right to self-determination. The with-
drawal of de jure recognition is a viola-
tion of the rule of non-intervention in the 
domestic affairs of States and their inde-
pendence that is upheld in Article 2 (7) of 
the UN Charter. Thus, should the opinion 
of Posner and Sykes
65
 be adopted that the 
recognition of the Libyan NTC was a 
withdrawal of the recognition of the Gad-
dafi regime and was therefore in violation 
of the UN Charter?  
Governments should represent their 
people. A group is in power because the 
people support them. The elites rule the 
country and make decisions for the whole 
population because the people have al-
lowed them to do so. When a government 
fights its own people, it means that the 
government has lost its representation and 
legitimacy. When a government is in 
power, its legitimacy is continuous until it 
commits mass crimes against its popula-
tion.
66
 This means that people no longer 
allow them to remain in power. The gov-
ernment becomes deplete of legitimacy. 
Arguably, what the Libya Contact Group 
did was not a withdrawal of recognition 
of a de jure government but it was a pro-
nouncement of the current situation in 
Libya.  
                                                          
65
 Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, Economic 
Foundations of International Law, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2013, Chapter 14.  
66
 Stephan Talmon. Note 10. p512. 
The Libya Contact Group did not 
withdraw recognition of the Gaddafi re-
gime, but the Gaddafi regime withdrew 
itself from legitimacy by committing 
mass atrocities against its own people. 
The Libya Contact Group just announced 
the transmission of power to the new 
group. The withdrawal of de jure recogni-
tion is different from announcing the fact 
that a group has lost its legitimacy be-
cause of its own violations and malfunc-
tions. The withdrawal of recognition is 
ignoring the sovereignty of a nation, but 
announcing the loss of legitimacy is sup-
porting the people‟s right to revolution 
and to democracy. In the case of Libya, 
the recognition of the Libyan NTC was 
announced at the same time as the decla-
ration of the loss of legitimacy of the 
Gaddafi regime because the Libya Con-
tact Group did not want to be accused of 
overlooking the sovereignty of Libya. 
Thus, it may be concluded that the Libyan 
NTC replaced the Gaddafi regime by re-
specting the sovereignty, independence 
and the fundamental human rights of the 
Libyan people. Recognition of the new 
government is withdrawal of the recogni-
tion of the old regime without violating 
the sovereign rights of the people on their 
land.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Recognition of the Libyan NTC proves 
that recognition still is a vibrant notion of 
international law. At the 66
th
 session of 
the UN General Assembly the question of 
the legitimacy of the NTC was raised and 
the Libyan NTC was recognized as the 
legitimate representative of the Libyan 
people. The provided recognition to the 
Libyan NTC was collective recognition.  
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States in providing individual recognition 
to the new government follow their poli-
cies and try to achieve privileges, while 
the collective recognition indicates the 
legal and correct attitude of the new gov-
ernment. Collective recognition of a new 
government can be used as a method of 
supporting democracy and promoting 
human rights. It simplifies and catalyses 
the transition of the society to democracy 
and respect for human rights. Moreover, 
puts an end to doubts concerning the con-
tinuity of the political and legal status of 
the former regime.  
Universal recognition is not a correct 
expression for addressing the recognition 
provided by international organizations 
such as GA. It is suggested that instead of 
using the expression “universal recogni-
tion”, the expression “collective recogni-
tion” should be used because it matches 
the current realities of the international 
community. 
Gadhafi regime by fighting its own 
people lost its representation and legiti-
macy. Revoking the political position of 
the Gaddafi delegates was not equivalent 
to the withdrawal of recognition but  
the government becomes deplete of 
legitimacy. Considering the fact that 
withdrawal of recognition of a de jure 
governments is against right to self-
determination and interning in internal 
affairs of States, arguably, what the Libya 
Contact Group did was not a withdrawal 
of recognition of a de jure government 
but it was a pronouncement of the current 
situation in Libya. The Libya Contact 
Group just announced the transmission of 
power to the new group.  
 
REFERENCES 
Arimatsu and Mohbouda.  2014. “The 
Legal Classification of the Armed 
Conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Libya,” 
Chatham House.  
Bangerter. 2011. “Reasons why Armed 
Groups Choose to Respect 
International Humanitarian Law or 
not,” International Review of the Red 
Cross. 
Brierly,James leslie. 1963. The Law of 
Nations, Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Brownlie, Ian. 1998. Principles of 
Public International Law, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Corbett, Percy E. 2015. The Growth of 
World Law. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
d`Aspremont. 2006. “Legitimacy of 
Governments in the Age of Democ-
racy.” Journal of International Law 
and Politics.  
Christie, Kennith and Denny Roy. 2001. 
The Politics of Human Rights in East 
Asia. London: Pluto Press.  
Dixon, Martin and Robert Mc 
Corquodale. 2003.  Cases and 
Materials in International Law, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
D. J. Harris, 2004, Cases and Materials 
in International Law, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell. 
Fox, Gregory H. and Brad R. Roth. 
2000. Democratic governance and 
International Law. UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
G. Pope, Atkins.1997. Encyclopaedia of 
the Inter-American System. Westport: 
Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport. 
Grant,Thomas D. 1999.  The 
Recognition of States: Law and 
Practice in Debate and Evolution, 
California: Praeger Publishers.  
Hamed Hasyemi Saugheh and Rohaida Nordin 
 
 Sriwijaya Law Review  Vol. 2 Issue 1, January (2018) [ 81 ] 
 
Hogger, Daniel. 2015. The Recognition of 
States, Musnter: LIT Verlag Munster.  
Jennings, Robert and Arthur Watts 
KCMG. 1955. Oppenheim’s 
International Law, UK: Longman. 
Joyner, Christopher C. 2005. 
International Law in the 21
st
 Century: 
Rules for Global Governance. Oxford: 
Rowman & Littlefield.  
Kufuor. 2002. “The OAU and the 
Recognition of Governments in Africa: 
Analysing its Practice and Proposals 
for the Future,” American International 
law review. 
Lauterpacht, Hersch. 1947. 
Recognition in International Law. UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
M. J. Peterson. Recognition of 
Governments: Legal Doctrine and 
State Practice. London: Palgrave 
Macmillian. 1997.  
Posner, Eric A. and Alan O. Sykes. 2013. 
Economic Foundations of International 
Law, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press.  
Raic, David. 2002. Statehood and the 
Law of Self-Determination, Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.   
Ramcharan. 1997.  “The International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia: 
Official Papers.” BRILL.  
Shaw, Malcolm N. 2003.  International 
Law. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Sithole. 2013. “The African Union 
Peace and Security mechanism‟s crawl 
from design to reality: Was the Libyan 
crisis a depiction of severe 
limitations?” African Journal on 
Conflict Resolution.. 
Sloane. 2006. “The Changing Face of 
Recognition in International Law: A 
Case Study of Tibet,” Emory Interna-
tional Law Review. 
Talmon. 2004. “Constitutive Versus 
The Declaratory Theory of 
Recognition: Tertium Non Datur?,” 
The British Yearbook of International 
Law. 
Talmon,Stephan. 1999.  Who is a Le-
gitimate Government in Exile? To-
wards Normative Criteria for Govern-
mental Legitimacy in International 
Law, the Reality of International Law, 
Essays in Honour of Ian Brownlie. Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press. 
Van Essen, 2012. “De Facto Regimes 
in International Law,” Utrecht Journal 
of International and European law, 28. 
Vidmar, Jure. 2009. Democracy and 
State Creation in International Law. 
Nottingham: University of Nottingham. 
Vidmar. 2012. “Explaining the Legal 
Effects of Recognition,” International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly. 
Von Glahn, Gerhard.2017.  Law among 
Nations. New York:  Taylor and 
Francis.  
Wolfrum and Philip. 2002. “The Status of 
the Taliban: Their Obligations and Rights 
under International Law,” Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law.  
Worster. 2009. “Law, Politics and the 
Conception of the State in State Recogni-
tion Theory,” Boston University Interna-
tional Law Journal. 
